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Protecting the Workers: The Medical Board
and the Asbestos Industry, 1930s-1960s
GEOFFREY TWEEDALE and PHILIP HANSEN*
Introduction
In the 1990s, asbestos-related illnesses constitute the most serious category of
occupational disease in the UK. The three major diseases caused by asbestos-namely,
asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma-now account for about 3,000 deaths each
year.1 That number is still rising. According to one estimate, annual male mesothelioma
deaths will peak in about the year 2020 with some 2,000 to 3,300 deaths. For the worst
affected group-men born in the 1940s-mesothelioma may account for one per cent of
all deaths.2 By any standards, asbestos is one of the leading causes of occupationally
related deaths in the twentieth century.
Most of us regard asbestos and its related health problems as a "scare" and "epidemic"
of fairly recent times-say, from the 1960s. However, the medical community's
knowledge about the dangers of asbestos extends almost a hundred years.3 The first
diagnosis of a fatal case ofasbestosis (a disease then known as fibroid phthisis) was made
by a British physician, Dr Montague Murray, in 1899.4 Although this evidence was later
submitted to a government enquiry, it did not arouse widespread interest. During the
1920s, however, medical knowledge about the hazards of asbestos grew markedly, as did
the industry itself. In 1924, a female worker at the Rochdale factory of Turner & Newall
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1 This is an estimate, as there are no entirely
accurate figures on asbestos mortality. The best
official estimates show over 1,000 deaths from
mesothelioma each year (1991 figures) and a similar
figure for asbestos-related lung cancers. See Health
& Safety Commission, Health and safety statistics
1994-95, London, HMSO, 1995, pp. 55, 148-51;
Health & Safety Commission, Annual report
1994-95, London, HMSO, 1995, pp. 107-17;
S Hutchings, et al., 'Asbestos-related diseases', in
Health & Safety Executive, Occupational health:
decennial supplement, London, HMSO, 1996, ed.
F Driver, pp. 127-52.
2 See Julian Peto, et al., 'Continuing increase in
mesothelioma mortality in Britain', Lancet, 1995,
345: 535-9.
3 Morris Greenberg, 'The Montague Murray
case', Am. J. ind. Med., 1982, 3: 351-6; idem,
'Knowledge of the health hazard of asbestos prior to
the Merewether and Price report of 1930', Soc. Hist.
Med., 1994, 7: 493-516.
4 Asbestosis is a pneumoconiosis-a fibrosis of
the lungs, caused by exposure (invariably
occupational) to asbestos. Though not always fatal, it
is a degenerative condition which is incurable. See
Irving J Selikoff and Douglas H K Lee, Asbestos and
disease, New York, Academic Press, 1978.
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(the leading British asbestos firm) died from "asbestos poisoning", a fact which was
confirmed at inquest. When the pathologist involved, Dr William E Cooke, wrote up the
case in the British Medical Journal in 1927 (after first publicizing it in 1924), he coined
the term by which the disease has since been known-"pulmonary asbestosis" (or simply,
asbestosis).5 Following Cooke's report, between 1928 and 1929, at least a dozen separate
medical publications carried discussions and articles about the disease.
Knowledge ofthe carcinogenic potential of asbestos, especially its role in lung cancer,
took a little longer to develop. Nevertheless, by the 1940s some doctors and the leading
asbestos firms were aware of an unusual rise in the number of lung cancer deaths in
asbestos workers.6 In 1955, the lung cancer/asbestos link was confirmed from Turner &
Newall data by the epidemiologist, (Sir) Richard Doll. By the late 1950s, another fatal
asbestos-related cancer was being identified-mesothelioma. This disease is a highly
malignant and painful tumour ofthe pleura (the lining ofthe chest) or the peritoneum (the
lining ofthe abdomen). It may take decades to appear (sometimes over forty years), even
afterrelatively limited exposure, but once the disease develops it can kill within a year. Its
link with asbestos-which is the only recognized occupational cause of mesothelioma-
emerged in 1960 (see Table 1).
Even allowing for the long latency of asbestos-related diseases, it seems that
government, industry and the medical community have had plenty ofadvance warning of
the dangers. How then is one to account for the current asbestos health problem?
Table 1:
Asbestos-Related Diseases
DISEASES LATENCY DISCOVERY PRESCRIBED
INDUSTRIAL DISEASE
Asbestosis 15 years + 1924' 1931
Lung cancer 20 years + 19552 1985
Mesothelioma 30 years + 19603 1966
l W E Cooke, 'Fibrosis ofthe lungs due to the inhalation of asbestos dust,' Br med. J., 1924, ul:
147; idem, 'Pulmonary asbestosis', Br med. J., 1927, ii: 1024-5.
2 R Doll, 'Mortality from lung cancer in asbestos workers', Br. J. ind. Med., 1955, 12: 81-6.
3 J C Wagner, C A Sleggs, and P Marchand, 'Diffuse pleural mesotheliomas and asbestos
exposure in the north-western Cape Province', Br J. ind. Med., 1960, 17: 260-71.
N.B. Latency periods are approximate, as these can vary widely from months to decades for
asbestosis and from a few years to decades for the cancers. For example, in the dusty factories
before 1930, asbestosis could develop in under five years. Discovery dates only refer to landmark
medical articles. In each disease, the asbestos industry's knowledge pre-dated these publications.
5 See I Selikoffand M Greenberg, 'A landmark cancer. It is also now recognized that asbestos alone
case in asbestosis', J. Am. med. Ass., 1991, 265: can initiate lung cancer, without first causing
898-901. asbestosis.
6 Perhaps halfof asbestosis sufferers die of lung
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Predictably, historians, journalists and medico-legal experts have blamed the asbestos
industry. In America, an avalanche oflitigation has unearthed a vast archive on the leading
asbestos producers, which has provided plenty of evidence of corporate cover-ups on
occupational health. Books by Paul Brodeur and particularly by Barry Castleman have
seemingly sealed the fate of the asbestos industry beneath a mountain of incriminating
documents.7 In the early 1990s, the attack on the industry began anew, when Chase
Manhattan Bank took T&N (formerly Turner & Newall) to court, seeking massive
damages for the removal of asbestos from its New York skyscraper.8 The case went
against Chase in 1995, but not before the bank's lawyers had microfilmed a million T&N
records at its Manchester depository.9 This material has armed British plaintiffs and also
allowed the media (and historians) to tarnish further the asbestos industry's reputation.'0
These publications are a necessary and welcome counterweight to the propaganda
disseminated by powerful business interests. It is clear, however, that they cannot provide
the whole picture. Ifthere was acorporate cover-up in asbestos, it was certainly one which
the asbestos companies could not have perpetrated alone. After all, since 1931 asbestos
manufacture in the UK has been subject to government health regulations. For example,
the Factory Inspectorate visited asbestos premises, seeking to apply government dust
control limits. Insurers (and their medical advisers) were drawn into the industry's
problems through the compensation aspects of occupational health. The medical
community were involved with asbestos, too, as local practitioners, company physicians,
government experts, pathologists and medical researchers. Crucially, from the 1930s
many asbestos workers were examined regularly by government medical boards. With so
much medical expertise available, how did the asbestos health problem become so
intractable?
This area of occupational health in the UK has yet to be studied.11 Our article focuses
on the involvement of one part of the medical community-the government-controlled
Medical Boards-with the British asbestos industry. These Boards were established in
1931 in the aftermath of a government enquiry into the health hazards of asbestos
manufacture. They were intended as a linchpin in a system designed to protect the
asbestos worker. By the 1940s, these Boards had metamorphosed into Pneumoconiosis
Medical Panels;12 and were retitled again in 1984 when they became Medical Boarding
7 Paul Brodeur, Outrageous misconduct: the
asbestos industry on trial, New York, Pantheon
Books, 1985; Barry Castleman, Asbestos: medical
and legal aspects, 4th ed., Englewood Cliffs, Aspen
Law & Business, 1996. See also David E Lilienfeld,
'The silence: the asbestos industry and early
occupational cancer research-a case study,' Am. J.
Pub. Health, June 1991, 81: 791-800.
8 Chase Manhattan Bank v. T&N (87 Civ. 4436,
Judge J G Koeltl), US District Court, Southern
District of New York, 27 Oct.- 6 Dec. 1995.
9 Access to T&N documents was granted under
American law's wide-ranging powers of "discovery".
The archive is now in the public domain. The present
article is based on the Chase microfilm and relevant
documents are cited using the Chase reeVframe
numbers.
10 David J Jeremy, 'Corporate responses to the
emergent recognition of a health hazard in the UK
asbestos industry: the case ofTurner & Newall,
1920-1960', Bus. econ. Hist., 1995, 24: 254-65.
11 The involvement ofAmerican occupational
health physicians with the asbestos industry has been
explored in David Ozonoff, 'Failed warnings:
asbestos-related disease and industrial medicine', in
R Bayer (ed.), The health and safety ofworkers: case
studies in thepolitics ofprofessional responsibility,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1988,
pp. 139-218. Also useful for its American
perspective is D Rosner and G Markowitz, Deadly
dust: silicosis and thepolitics ofoccupational
disease in twentieth-century America, Princeton
University Press, 1991.
12 G B Rooke, 'The Pneumoconiosis Medical
Panels', Occupational Health, August 1983,
35: 356-60.
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Centres. Still at the heart of medical decision-making in asbestos compensation cases,
these groups and their actions have invited recent scrutiny. It would be too much to assert
that they are controversial institutions: however, several commentators have expressed
disquiet at their structure and past performance. Critics have focused upon conflicts of
interest amongst Medical Board personnel, with evidence that some doctors have unduly
close links with industry. It has also been argued that diagnoses have been too
conservative, with an alleged rule-of-thumb element apparently confirmed by wide
regional variations in diagnoses.'3
The evidence for these weaknesses, however, has been drawn from the experience of
the last twenty years. Until now, the performance of the Medical Boards between the
1930s and 1950s has been largely a mystery. Dealings between the Boards and workers
and industrialists were necessarily private; decisions were rarely publicized; and the
Board's documentation and radiographic evidence have apparently not been preserved.
However, the recent American asbestos litigation has brought to light new evidence
regarding the work ofthe Medical Board system and the asbestos industry from the 1930s.
In this article, we utilize this material to examine the role ofthe Medical Board, especially
its relationship with the foremost asbestos producer, Turner & Newall.14
Medical Surveillance ofAsbestos Workers
Alerted to the growing asbestos mortality, in 1928 the government had commissioned two
members of its Factory Inspectorate-Dr E R A Merewether and C W Price-to prepare a
study ofworkers' health inthe asbestos textileindustry. Theresults oftheirreport-which was
published in 1930 and has been recognized as a classic work in occupational health-were
unequivocal.15 Having selected 363 asbestos factory workers from an estimated total UK
workforce of2,200, theyfoundthatoverone-quarterofthesamplehadasbestosis, and21 more
had early signs ofthe disease. The incidence ofthe disease increased markedly with duration
ofemployment: exclidingthoseemployedunderfiveyears, about 35 percentofworkers were
affected. After twenty years, four out offive workers still in the industry had asbestosis.
13 Nicholas J Wikeley, Compensationfor
industrial disease, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993,
pp. 144-60. The Society for the Prevention of
Asbestosis & Industrial Diseases (SPAID), a victims'
pressure group founded in 1978 by Nancy Tait, has
been particularly critical of the government Medical
Panels. For example, in 1986 SPAID pointed out that
the London Medical Panel included the physician
who consulted for an asbestos producer, Cape
Industries. See N Tait, 'The role of SPAID ... in the
prevention ofdisease and the welfare ofsufferers', in
S S Chissick and R Derricott, Asbestos, New York,
Wiley & Sons, 1983, vol. 2, pp. 9-50. See also J
Leneghan, Victims twice over: a report into how
members ofClydeside action on asbestos are
disabled by lung disease andfurther handicapped by
medical anid social services, Glasgow, Clydeside
Action on Asbestos, 1994.
14 Turner & Newall (renamed T&N in 1987)
started as a private company formed in 1920 by the
merger offour older firms. Turner Brothers Asbestos
(hereinafter TBA) in Rochdale was the headquarters
ofthe business between the 1920s and 1950s. The
other subsidiaries were the Washington Chemical Co.
ofWearside, County Durham; Newalls Insulation
Co.; and J W Roberts, of Leeds. After flotation on
the stock exchange in 1925, Ferodo Ltd, ofChapel-
en-le-Frith, Derbyshire, was acquired. This created a
vertically integrated and multinational business,
which by the 1960s had sales exceeding the largest
US producer, Johns Manville. See Jeremy, op. cit.,
note 10 above; and Turner & Newall Limited: the
firstfifty years, 1920-1970, Manchester, Turner &
Newall, 1970). T&N now manufactures automotive
components and has ceased asbestos manufacture.
15 E R A Merewether and C W Price, Report on
effects ofasbestos dust on the lungs and dust
suppression in the asbestos industry, London,
HMSO, 1930.
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This clearly called for action by the government and in 1930 discussions began with the
leading asbestos manufacturers. Legislation followed relatively speedily in the form of an
Asbestosis Scheme, which contained a three-pronged assault on the problem. First, the
government introduced the Asbestos Industry Regulations (in force from 1933), which
stipulatedthatexhaustventilation wastobe appliedtothedustiestmanufacturing operations.
Enforcement was to be backed by the government's Factory Inspectorate. Second, with the
recognition of asbestosis as an industrial disease, came its inclusion under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. This was accomplished by extending the arrangements already in place
for silicosis to covercertain asbestosjobs.16 Third, amedical scheme was to screen workers
entering theindustry and then monitortheirhealth, so that sickworkers couldbe suspended.
Compulsory annual medical examinations were provided for by the Silicosis and
Asbestosis (Medical Arrangements) Scheme of 1931. Included in this legislation were
employees inthepreparatory processes (crushing, disintegrating, andgrinding) andalsothose
in asbestos textiles and mattress-making (for locomotive boilers). The Medical Scheme
operatedthrough aMedical Board system, which hadoriginallybeenestablished todeal with
silicosis cases, with offices in Sheffield, Bristol, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, and Stoke-on-Trent.
Sheffield was made the headquarters and DrCharles L Sutherland, with his office there, was
appointed Chief Medical Officer.17 Each Board was staffed by two "specially qualified
medical practitioners" appointed by the government, who monitored those workers deemed
to be at risk. To pay for this monitoring, a special fund was set up into which the employer
paid fees for medical examinations and certificates. In addition, the employer had to arrange
for the examination ofnew workers and to furnish appropriate facilities at the works for the
routine periodic medical examinations.18 Any workers who were suspended as unfit by the
Medical Board (or who died from asbestosis) were to be brought within the scope of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, which awarded workers (or their dependants) compensation
or death benefit. Coroners and registrars ofbirths, marriages and deaths were instructed to
enquire into the deaths of asbestos workers in receipt of pensions or when their length of
service and occupation were likely to have contributed to their death. In all certified cases,
necropsies were performed and tissue examined histologically. If the Medical Board was
satisfied thatdeath was dueto asbestosis andthen issued (onpaymentofafee) aspecialdeath
certificate, a worker's dependants could claim death benefit.19 The decisions ofthe Medical
Board regarding suspension and causes ofdeath were final and could notbe reversed.
16 Further legislation modified compensation in
the asbestos industry. The Workman's Compensation
Act (1943) extended the scope ofcompensation to
pneumoconiosis, which includes silicosis and
asbestosis, but is a broader term. In July 1948, when
the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries Act),
1946, came into operation, individual employers
were relieved oftheir liability to pay compensation
to people to whom the former Workmen's
Compensation Acts would have applied. This
compensation was replaced by benefits payable to
the workman or his dependants by the state from an
Industrial Injuries Fund to which every employer and
employee contributed weekly. The following
discussion mostly centres on the operation of the
1931 asbestos legislation and the "old" Workmen's
Compensation Act of 1925.
17 Andrew Meiklejohn, 'The development of
compensation for occupational diseases ofthe lungs
in Great Britain', Br J. ind. Med., July 1954,
11: 198-212.
18 It was not compulsory for firms to employ
company physicians, though after 1928 TBA
employed a medical officer. The first was W Hirst
Bateman, a Rochdale doctor, and he was succeeded
in 1949 by Dr John F Knox.
19 Form A certificated death from asbestosis; Form
B was for total disablement; Form C for partial
incapacity; Form D was used for re-examination;
Form E certified suspension due to tuberculosis; and
Form F notified failure with respect to physique.
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Two points should be emphasized about the Asbestosis Scheme. First, it was a
pioneering piece oflegislation and the UK became the first country officially to recognize
asbestosis. Second, the main impetus for the Scheme had come from the government and
the enlightened efforts oftwo health and safety experts. The asbestos industry itself, faced
with medical and compensation costs (in addition to capital expenditure on dust
prevention), was not an enthusiastic supporter of the new regulations.20 The result was
that the Asbestosis Scheme contained some serious weaknesses from the viewpoint ofthe
workers. For example, workers who had left the industry before 1 May 1931 (when the
Scheme became effective) were not covered. Even those within the scheme had to claim
within three years of leaving the industry-a cruel proviso, given the already known
extended latency ofasbestos disease.21
Even worse, lobbying by the industry had resulted in the creation of so-called
"scheduled areas". These were the sections in the factories where the main manufacturing
processes-crushing, carding, spinning, weaving and mattress-making-were conducted.
Workers outside these areas were excluded from medical surveillance and often from
compensation.22 For example, it was decided that workers making brake-shoes, rubber-
proofed goods and woven materials would not be at risk of developing asbestosis. The
regulations did not apply to clerical staff, either. In particular, laggers and otherinsulation
workers were excluded from the medical scheme. Another exclusion clause effectively
excluded those laggers and factory workers whose work in mixing asbestos materials was
only "occasional"-defined as no more than eight hours in any week. The net impact of
the 1931 scheme at TBA in Rochdale was that about 500 workers were within the
scheduled areas. Yet that was only half the workforce, and at the periphery ofthe Turner
& Newall business the medical surveillance in the satellite firms grew even weaker or
even non-existent.
These exclusions allowed Turner & Newall, in the words of one of its directors, the
possibility of "stretching the regulations to suit our own ends".23 Yet within a year, there
were soon doubts that such exclusion clauses were wise. Another study by Merewether
showed that asbestos packers, warehousemen and storekeepers were also at risk and he
recommended that they should also be included in the Scheme.24 In June 1932, Home
Office officials called a meeting in London with the asbestos manufacturers, including
Turner & Newall, to discuss these proposals. The manufacturers were opposed to any
extension of the Scheme and met beforehand-at Turner & Newall's suggestion- "to
arrange an organised line of resistance".25 At the subsequent meeting with the
20 N Wikeley, op. cit., note 13 above, pp. 102-11. medical monitoring. Workers could apply to the
See also idem, 'The Asbestos Regulations 1931: a Medical Board independently, but this involved
licence to kill?', J. Law Soc., 1992, 19: 365-78. paying a fee, not all ofwhich was returned even ifa
21 In 1939, the time-limit was extended to five worker was suspended.
years, and then abolished completely in 1948. 23 10/1625. R H Turner to G S Newall, 30 Dec.
22 The compensation clauses within the Asbestosis 1932.
Scheme covered a slightly wider number of 24 12/20. E R A Merewether (with E L
manufacturing processes than the medical scheme. Middleton), 'Asbestosis: report ofinquiry into the
This led to a number ofanomalies, with some existence ofthe disease in packers ofmanufactured
workers eligible for compensation (provided they articles' (1932).
could prove that they were unfit), but denied regular 25 12/59. R H Turner to British Belting &
medical examinations. In the lagging trades, for Asbestos Ltd, 7 June 1932.
example, the onus was on the employer to provide
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government, the industry representatives successfully deflected any new proposals, partly
by giving a "definite assurance" that the Scheme would be "interpreted broadly, so as to
cover all genuine cases of asbestosis occurring in the works."26 On the whole they were
well pleased at the outcome. They had succeeded, through the exclusion clauses and the
creation of scheduled areas, in drawing an administrative boundary around their product.
Unfortunately, it was not a boundary that asbestos fibre respected.
The Medical Board: Diagnosis and Prescription
The medical arrangements scheme seems to have been launched smoothly with the help
of the asbestos industry. However, Turner & Newall evidently found certain features of
the scheme extremely irksome. The maincomplaint was overwhat the company described
as the "exorbitant fees" levied by the Medical Board for its examinations. Turner &
Newall felt that these were an excessive charge against the whole industry and said so
when it met the Home Office in 1932 to plead for areduction.27 The industry also lobbied
sympathetic MPs, such as Douglas Jamieson in Glasgow. His parliamentary question
highlighted the "large expenses incurred" in medical examinations for such a small group
of unfit men.28 Turner & Newall (and others in the industry) complained also about the
fact that there was no appeal against Medical Board decisions; that X-ray examinations
caused the worker to lose time; and that the check-ups on workers were too frequent. The
workers (according to Turner & Newall) did not welcome annual examinations, "which
cause them considerable anxiety". The Medical Board were unsympathetic to most of
these complaints. In particular, Turner & Newall were unsuccessful in their request that
the medical records ofits workers should be open for consultation by the company.29 Not
surprisingly, the relationship between Turner & Newall and the Medical Board-though
superficially cordial-was occasionally marked by distrust and thinly veiled contempt.
Besides fending offTurner & Newall, the medical examiners certainly faced a difficult
job in other ways. A medical suspension was a serious matter: it affected both the
livelihood of the worker and the interests of the employer. Although the Medical Board
adopted the role of ultimate arbiter through its "specially qualified" experts, its
assessments were in some ways a political exercise.30 Moreover, diagnosing asbestosis
(which was the only prescribed asbestos disease before 1966) was not easy, even with
annual examinations.31 This wasespecially so in the 1930s and 1940s, when lung function
tests were yet to be widely used and radiographic reading techniques were still improving.
26 12/100. J M Duckland, Home Office, to British workers, because of its impact on their livelihood.
Fibro-Cement Co., 20 July 1932. See below p. 448.
27 43/318. Asbestosis Committee minute book, re. 31 TheTurner & Newall files show that most
Home Office deputation, 27 Sept. 1932, pp. 1-5. workers were examined regularly, though sometimes
28 According to Sir John Gilmour, in answer to it could be anything between eighteen months to two
Jamieson's question in 1932, the total amount paid years between appointments. After 1948, check-ups
into the Medical Expenses Fund by the employers were made every other year, and after 1967 Turner &
was £2,300. See 10/1619. Hansard clipping. Newall medical officers were examining the worker
29 43/279. Asbestosis Committee minute book, in the intervening period-in other words, a defacto
20 Jan. 1932, p. 2. annual examination. See H C Lewinsohn, 'The
30 This can be clearly shown by the fact that the medical surveillance ofasbestos workers', R. Soc.
government did not give the Board the power to Health J., 1972, 92: 69-77.
enforce the suspensions ofold or long-serving
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It was simple enough to diagnose advanced asbestosis, especially with a clear history, but
far less straightforward to identify the disease in its early stages. The transition from a
healthy to adiseased state was not clear-cut. Asbestosis was treacherous: the disease could
progress for many years, with scarcely any ill-effects on the lungs, then suddenly the
worker would start to deteriorate. As Merewether noted, the disease could often be
misdiagnosed even in its "terminal stages, [when] the disease, deceitful to the last, may
masquerade as chronic bronchitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, broncho-pneumonia, or the
like."32 This was a particular problem in Rochdale, where bronchial troubles, especially
tuberculosis, were common before the Second World War. Asbestosis was also a newly-
prescribed disease, which meantthatthe Medical Board was conservative in its diagnoses.
This conservatism is apparent in the number of suspensions in the asbestos industry in
the first year ofthe Scheme's operation-a mere 32 cases oftotal disablement from 1,516
examinations.33 By 1934, thishadrisen to 60 cases ofdisablement and 3 deaths.34 AtTBA
itself, the initial examination of602 workers (costing £1.6.Od a head), with X- rays of98
(at £1.11.6d a head), had resulted in the Medical Board proposing to suspend about 14
workers.35 According to one official company listofasbestosis cases, lessthan 30 workers
were suspended between 1931 and 1933 for the whole group. These were all
extraordinarily low numbers considering thatMerewether and Price had found 95 definite
cases of asbestosis in their sample of 363 workers, and 21 more had early signs of the
disease. The low suspension rate is also surprising when one considers that the dangers of
even slight asbestosis were known amongst doctors. In 1933, E R A Merewether had
warned that even a moderate degree of asbestosis was "a serious and ever-present
potential risk to life", because of the ability of the disease to destroy the body's reserve
capacity.36 Yet even by 1940, the Medical Board had suspended only 139 workers (54 at
TBA) in the entire asbestos industry (see Table 2).
By the 1960s, diagnosis of asbestosis was made on a history of asbestos exposure plus
two positive findings from the following-the presence of basal rales, finger-clubbing,
radiological appearances andpulmonary function studies. ThecriteriausedbytheMedical
Board in the 1930s were less refined, with the emphasis on a chest examination.
Merewether believed that even in those days, diagnoses could be made withfaircertainty
if asbestosis was present in some degree and if both physical and radiological
examinations were made. However, X-rays were used sparingly by the Medical Board in
the 1930s and 1940s and were only utilized when symptoms became very pronounced or
if a worker needed to be suspended (when an X-ray was mandatory). Table 2 shows that
in the 1930s only about one in ten workers were X-rayed at their annual examinations.
It was perhaps unfortunate for the worker that clinically diffuse fibrosis was quite
compatible with continued work in the industry, especially since most asbestos jobs did
32 Quoted in Castleman, op. cit., note 7 above, p. 36 E R A Merewether, 'A memorandum on
12. asbestosis', Tubercle, Dec. 1933, 15: 114.
33 37/617-24. C L Sutherland, 'Report on the first 37 As will be apparent from the discussion below,
periodic examinations in the asbestos industry' however, a worker did not need to be certified to
(1933). suffer or die from asbestosis (or cancer). Official
34 Memorandum on the industrial diseases of figures show 148 deaths from asbestosis between
silicosis andasbestosis, London, HMSO, 1935, p. 3. 1931 and 1940. See A T Doig, 'Asbestos disease',
35 9/485. Commercial Union report, 23 March Health Bulletin, 1968, 26: 24-9, 26.
1932.
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Table 2:
Medical Board (and TBA) Asbestosis Statistics, 1932-40
YEAR PERIODIC EXAMINATIONS EXAMINATIONS
AFTER APPLICATION
Clinical X-Rays Suspensions: Suspensions: Workmen Suspended:
Exams Asbestosis Tuberculosis Examined Asbestosis
1932 665 16 95 2 26 14 2 - 6 - 4 -
1933 1157 541 123 18 7 2 3 3 16 2 6 1
1934 530 - 86 - 9 - 1 - 10 2 7 1
1935 1099 509 150 59 32 11 - - 9 1 4 1
1936 1223 543 126 28 12 - - 3 - - -
1937 863 22 73 1 4 6 - - 7 2 3 1
1938 1463 564 185 84 10 6 2 - 10 1 3 -
1939 1547 716 105 41 4 5 2 - 6 4 5 4
1940 1595 535 104 44 - I - - 4 1 3 1
Total 10142 3446 1047 277 104 45 10 3 71 13 35 9
Medical Board figures in bold; Turner Brothers Asbestos in italics.
not demand great exertion. Asbestosis seems to have been a disease of which one could
believe the best or the worst. Inevitably, industry chose the former; so, too, did the
Medical Board, as its guidelines often gave workers the "benefit" of the doubt. As one
official explained in 1933 regarding a worker whom the Board had not suspended (yet
who died from asbestosis soon after);
the Board were naturally cautious in certifying as a result of the first examination that a workman
was suffering from asbestosis to such a degree as to render it dangerous for him to continue in the
industry, and ... there were aconsiderable numberofcases which were classified as distinct fibrosis
which were not considered sufficiently definite tojustify suspension.38
The key words here, as the Medical Board pointed out, were "dangerous for [the worker]
to continue in the industry"-a phrase from the Workmen's Compensation Act itself.
Providing that condition was met, then it seems that the worker was free to return to the
factory with a clean bill of health (a "no action" certificate). The Medical Board had the
power to exempt workers underthe Compensation Acts, ifit believed theirgeneral physical
capacity was not impaired or ifthere was some other reason.39 For example, George Jones
(1892-1963), a TBA carder and spinner, was suspended in 1935, yet was allowed to
38 67/351-3. E Field (Silicosis & Asbestos
Medical Expenses Fund), to Ellison, TBA, 5 Aug.
1933. Grindrod file. Sutherland, op. cit., note 33
above, p. 3, admitted that the Board had found 79
cases of"distinct fibrosis" and that "the number of
suspensions must not therefore be taken as a strict
indication ofthe incidence of the disease".
39 Exemptions were under Section 22 (d) ofthe
Compensation Act. It seems to have been invoked
particularly in wartime. See below p. 449.
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continue in the scheduled areas until 1947.40 Roberts' carder Arthur Greensmith was issued
with a certificate of suspension in 1939, when the Medical Board told him that he had
asbestosis in its "early stage". With the worker's approval, however, an appeal was made for
him to continue carding and the Medical Board waived the suspension. He was never
properly suspended from work, though he left hisjob in August 1943-three months before
his death from asbestosis.41 One TBA spinner was told by the Board in 1940 that she had
asbestosis "to somedegree" andTurner&Newall were also "unofficially" informed. Yet she
was issued with a "no action" certificate and was not suspended until 1942.42
Even after 1943, when compensation for coal miner's pneumoconiosis was introduced
and the Medical Boards were reorganized as Pneumoconiosis Medical Panels,43 the latter
still gave workers with asbestosis considerable leeway. The Panels did not notify the
employer when skilled or long-serving workers (those over forty-five years ofage and with
twenty ormore years' service) hadasbestosis, without the latter's consent. This was alegacy
ofthe old silicosis compensation legislation and Turner & Newall were amongst those who
had requested its retention as a "valuable safeguard", so that experienced workers could
possibly beretained.44Mostly workersdid allowthePanels toinform thecompany, butthere
were occasions when they kept the diagnosis to themselves, an action which meant that
some cases of asbestosis were not notified to the company.45 Skilled and long-serving
employees were reminded that the Panel had no power to suspend them unless they applied
in writing for a certificate and that they could continue in their oldjob, providing that their
working conditions did not get any dustier. In 1956, for example, a TBA beamer, Harry
Maden, was told that he had pneumoconiosis (i.e. asbestosis) in its early stage, but that he
"could continue in his present occupation provided he work[ed] in dust conditions no worse
than at present."46 Some workers decided that they would continue working. A Roberts'
asbestos crusher, William Birch, was told he had early-stage asbestosis in 1951, but the
Panel gave him the chance to stay on and the company found him a less strenuousjob at a
fibre-opening machine. Only four years later he died after a gastric ulcer operation, and an
inquest recorded that his death was partly caused by asbestosis. A chiefclerk testified at the
inquest that fibre opening was "not so dusty" [as Birch's previous job], adding for good
measure: "It was by his own choice that he continued working."47
40 122/2412. TBA to Commercial Union, 27 June
1952.
41 37/2239. 'Arthur Greensmith, deceased.'
42 122/1167. Memo 6 Dec. 1942. Louisa F Roney
file.
43 In 1948, the PMPs were brought under the
Ministry of National Insurance.
44 43/301. Asbestosis Committee meeting, 26 June
1932.
45 In 1972, TBA's chief medical officer, Dr H C
Lewinsohn, discovered two such workers (George
Henry and Elizabeth Homer), who had been
diagnosed with asbestosis and had received
disablement benefit without the company's
knowledge. When he complained to a senior
government medical officer, Lewinsohn was told:
"Suspension is at the discretion ofthe
Pneumoconiosis Medical Board, but is being used
less and less. It cannot be enforced. If it could be
enforced suspensions would put a claimant
completely out ofthe industry and put him more or
less on the scrapheap at an age when he would be
very unlikely to get anotherjob." 9/1920. R M
McGowan, 8 May 1972. Ofcourse, the company's
complaints are ironic, given that Turner & Newall
had themselves argued against compulsory
suispension in 1932.
46 123/2688. PMP to TBA, March 1956. TBA
moved him to the maintenance department in the
same year, but he died from asbestosis in 1965. See
also 123/4079.
47 116/773. R E Nutt, 14 Nov. 1955. In 1930,
Turner & Newall directors had adopted an attitude
similar to the PMPs. They argued that in old workers
with severe asbestosis, "the least personal harm
would be done to the employee ... by permitting
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Exactly why workers continued working in dusty jobs is difficult to say. Probably
economic security was uppermost in their minds: after all, the rates ofpay in the asbestos
industry were usually better than elsewhere. A medical suspension often meant transfer to
anotherjob, a wage cut, an end to promotion prospects, and the threat ofearly retirement.
The Medical Board may also have played a part by giving workers the impression that
their health was being carefully observed and protected. According to one T&N chief
medical officer: "the annual medical examinations acted as a reassurance for the
employee, giving a false sense of security ... [and] ... by allowing them to remain in
their dusty occupation if they so wished ... the Panel diminished the seriousness of the
condition in the minds ofthe workers."48
It is striking how often Turner & Newall "scheduled" workers at post-mortem were
demonstrated to have had asbestosis, yet were passed as fit enough to work (or certified
to have suffered from some other disease) by the Medical Board. At least thirty Turner &
Newall workers fell into this category. Medical Board decisions produced some striking
anomalies. Lily Fowler, a Roberts' mattress-maker, was suspended with tuberculosis (not
asbestosis) in 1938, thus denying her a claim for compensation. Her solicitors fought to
have this reversed, since further tests (presumably by another doctor) had detected
asbestosis. But the Medical Board do not appear to have issued another certificate, which
was perhaps unfortunate: she died from tuberculosis and asbestosis in 1943. No death
benefits appear to have beenpaid. Florence Fairbourn, a Roberts' weaver, received no less
than a dozen "no action" certificates between 1932 and 1945, and also had an X-ray in
1943. She was last examined by the Panel in October 1946 and sent for another
radiographic examination, but before the results were known she died in December 1946
(aged thirty-six). The coroner returned a verdict in accordance with the medical evidence:
heart disease and asbestosis.49
The war effort led the Medical Board to relax its suspension policy, especially if
workers were involved with so-called "wet weaving".50 John Mitchell, a TBA weaver in
his forties, was certified "no action" eight times; but in 1941 he was informed by letter (a
brutal way of delivering the news) that he had asbestosis, though the Board proposed to
take "no action in the meantime". Mitchell died from asbestosis in the same year. A
similar case was Harvey Hollows, who was told he had asbestosis in 1941, yet the Board
proposed to take no action. He was allowed to continue wet weaving until 1952-two
years before his death from asbestosis. James W Isherwood, a TBA weaver suspended
with mediumimpairment in 1935, was allowed to undertake wetweaving in 1942. He died
from lung cancer and asbestosis in 1948. Joseph Dorber, another TBA weaver, was
suspended under a Form C in 1935, but there was no disability due to asbestosis and he
was allowed to continue as a wet weaver. By 1948, a re-examination altered his status as
fit for light work only and he died from asbestosis in the same year.
him to remain at his present work ... [as] ... further confirm this.
exposure to a dusty atmosphere cannot produce 50 Damping was introduced in the late 1930s as a
additional harm." 161/49. TBA directors' meeting, not entirely successful attempt to minimize dust. On
12 Nov. 1930. the war, see also H A Waldron, 'Occupational health
48 Dr W Kerns, personal communication to author, during the Second World War: hope deferred or hope
8 April 1997. abandoned?', Med. Hist., 1997, 41, 197-212.
49 The Medical Board, however, refused to
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The file on David Kerrighan, who died in 1946, also casts doubts on the accuracy ofthe
Medical Board's diagnoses (and also highlights conflicts between various medical
authorities). In 1934, after about nine years in the scheduled areas (mostly in fiberizing at
Turner's Asbestos Cement works at Trafford), Kerrighan had been told by his local doctor
that he was unfit for work in the asbestos industry. Initially, Turner & Newall's medical
consultant, W Hirst Bateman, disagreed with this diagnosis: however, he later changed his
mind and advised Kerrighan to find an outdoorjob. He left TBA, never to work again. In
1936, the regional medical officer certified that Kerrighan was suffering from asbestosis.
He was therefore eligible for compensation, ifthe Medical Board would issue a certificate;
but after examining him, they refused. The subsequent post-mortem and inquest on the 46-
year-old Kerrighan found that he had died from tuberculosis probably preceded by
asbestosis.51
William Clegg, a TBA weaver, was never suspended by the Panel, though bizarrely
they advised him to leave the industry due to a long history of bronchitis. He died within
a year of his retirement in 1970, with a fatal combination of pneumonia, asbestosis and
lung cancer. Joseph P Buckley, in TBA's carding and spinning department, had five "no
action" certificates, before his work as ahoist operator took him out ofthe scheduled areas
and beyond the reach ofthe Medical Board examiners. He retired at sixty-five in 1941 and
died in the same year from asbestosis accelerated by tuberculosis. Clearly, it does not
appear to have been either government or company policy to follow up workers. Sarah
Holt, in carding and spinning, was never suspended by the Board, though a medical
examination in 1961 showed she had asbestosis, which killed her in the same year.
Rebecca P James, in TBA's spinning and weaving section, had eleven "no actions" up to
1947, yet died from tuberculosis accelerated by asbestosis in 1951.
Even more singular are the details of the Grindrod case in 1933. James Grindrod was a
forty-year-old Rochdale weaver, who was told by his local doctor in 1931 to give up his
asbestos job because of dyspnoea. However, the Medical Board examined him at the
factory in 1933, when a "no action" certificate was issued. He died the same year from
pneumonia and asbestosis. At the inquest, the coroner remarked on the "somewhat curious
case of a man having been examined by the Medical Board specially set up to deal with
cases in the industry, and they came to the conclusion that his condition was
satisfactory."52 Coroners were making the same comments some twenty years later. At the
inquest of Roberts' carder, Harold Kaye, who died from asbestosis and cancer of the
peritoneum (probably mesothelioma) in 1952, the coroner was clearly puzzled that the
Medical Board had allowed him to continue working in the industry after they had found
in 1932 that he had a "slight degree offibrosis ofthe lungs". Kaye was suspended only in
1943, after a further nine "no action" certificates.
These problems in diagnosis evidently continued through the 1950s. Mark Tweedale
had worked for thirty-five years in the scheduled areas, having joined TBA in 1920 as a
labourer in the carding division. The Medical Board had reached no decision on him, yet
by 1955 he was virtually incapacitated with asbestosis. The company found him a job
sweeping up in the warehouse, but a departmental memo refers to him finding it 'difficult
even to walk about. It is pitiful to see him in his present condition, but he cannot be
51 122/933. Kerrighan file. 52 Rochdale Observer, 10 June 1933.
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allowed to come in work and not do a little work."53 Company physician W H Bateman
examined him and found him breathless even in a chair. He died in August 1955, aged
fifty-seven, from pneumonia and asbestosis, having never been suspended by the Panel.
Lily Taylor, aTBA carder and spinner, whohad worked in the scheduled areas forthirty
years, was a similar case. She was given no less than eleven Medical Board examinations
and one X-ray between 1931 -and 1947, each with a "no action" decision. She retired ill in
1949 and died in 1957 from congestive heart failure and asbestosis. After the inquest,
personnel manager George Chadwick wrote to one of his colleagues: "There is no doubt
that this verdict caused some surprise as Miss Taylor had been regularly examined by the
Medical Board during her employment with us and on each occasion a 'no action' report
was issued."54 As this discussion has shown, however, it should have been no surprise as
the situation had happened several times at the company.
Such cases not only had serious implications for the victims, but also for their relatives
because it tended to weaken their hand when claiming compensation. The lack of a prior
diagnosis of asbestosis gave Turner & Newall a lever in negotiations, as such workers
were evidently not considered normal asbestotics in the company's eyes. It is significant
that, apart from Grindrod, none of the above-named cases appears to have elicited any
lump sum compensation payment. In cases where the Board had not suspended a worker,
but then issued an asbestosis death certificate, Turner & Newall were furious. In the
Grindrod case, Bateman privately ridiculed the Medical Board's "claim to pontifical
infallibility", while the company formally protested at the Board's decision, declined
initially to pay the certificate fee, and clearly implied that the process favoured the
dependants. The Medical Board's response to Turner & Newall was suitably brusque. It is
true that occasionally the Medical Board did suspend a worker with fibrosis, whose lungs
at post-mortem were found to be free ofthe disease. However, this only occurred on about
three occasions at Turner & Newall in several hundred cases-underlining a very
conservative policy ofdiagnosis, which favoured the industry.
If the workers (or employers) were depending on the Medical Boards to provide
protection and advance warning, then many would be disappointed. Between 1931 and
1948, 142 Turner & Newall workers were suspended with asbestosis (the majority of
whom were to die from the disease): however, the more significant number is how many
non-suspended Turner & Newall workers died from asbestosis or its complications by
1948. That figure was 41, almost certainly an underestimate.55 In 1937, it was stated that
the Medical Board was beginning to suspend workers sooner,56 though this had little
immediate impact on the overall trend.
Even ifworkers were suspended reasonably early, Medical Board re-assessments could
still cause problems later, if the worker's condition deteriorated. This had an impact on
53 65/0817. Memo by F Shears, n.d. suspended workers were occasionally missed by the
54 122/1336. Chadwick to J Kemp, 4 Nov. 1957. coroner.
55 Totals are calculated from surviving T&N 56 36/1558. Turner & Newall company secretary
compensation files. Asbestos deaths are invariably John L Collins noted to a manager at Trafford Park,
underestimated, as asbestosis can be misdiagnosed 26 Jan. 1937: "the Medical Board are now being
and is not always identified on death certificates. very much more particular and are suspending cases
Moreover, not every non-suspended worker had a in the very early stages of the disease."
post-mortem or inquest: in fact, even some
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compensation payments-a subject that is explored in greater detail elsewhere.57 William
H Bolton (1890-1940) was suspended fromhis weavingjob atTBA in 1932. The Medical
Board had passed him fit for moderately heavy work and the company found him ajob in
the rubber goods department. Because his newjob was initially as well, ifnot better, paid
than the old, TBA did not pay him compensation. Thus they did not feel obliged to
compensate him when his chest complaint worsened between 1933 and 1935. A year later
he was virtually incapacitated, yet his claim for full compensation was blocked by the
Medical Board, which until March 1938 maintained that his condition was "unaltered".
Eventually, Bolton recruited local solicitors to plead his case. Basing their arguments on
legal precedents that the Medical Board's diagnosis was "notprophetic", they forced TBA
to refer his case to Dr Bateman. At the subsequent examination, Bateman found a pale,
thin and anxious man, who was troubled by shortness ofbreath, a cough and palpitations.
Bateman noted that "His chest ... gives the typical clinical signs of a severe degree of
asbestos fibrosis in the lungs. The heart is enlarged, especially on the right side and the
pulse is 144 and very irregular, the condition being one of auricular fibrillation." He
concluded: "This man is totally unfit for work."58 Full compensation followed, though
Bolton did not long survive and died in 1940.
One might have expected thatTurner & Newall's company doctorwould have provided
an important measure ofprotection forworkers, perhaps byquestioning thefindings ofthe
Medical Board and pressing for re-assessments. But Turner & Newall complained to the
Medical Board only when decisions went against their interests; they never appearto have
protested on behalf oftheir workers.
Post-Mortems, Inquests and Death Certificates
For most suspended workers, death from an asbestos-related disease followed with
depressing regularity. The most that their relatives could now hope for was a lump sum
settlement following "death by industrial disease". The usual prelude to a settlement was a
post-mortem and then the ordeal of an inquest-though not all workers had an inquest, or
even a post-mortem, as some were inevitably overlooked by the authorities. Even ifa post-
mortem and inquest were conducted, the outcome was far from certain, as these procedures
allowed Turner & Newall the chance fully to defend its position. The company was aided
by the fact that diagnosis ofasbestos-related disease was a medical minefield ofconflicting
views between various "experts": these included general practitioners andcompany doctors,
pathologists, and coroners, and even medically unqualifiedplantmanagers. This wasmainly
because asbestosis was always associated with other medical conditions, such as heart
failure, stroke, pneumonia, and lung cancer, all ofwhichcould cloud the issue. Significantly,
other major bronchial conditions-notably tuberculosis-occurred alongside asbestosis.
A growing problem for claimants was the fact that the 1931 regulations had been
formulated to deal with asbestosis, the only asbestos-related disease then known. We now
know that asbestos exposure can lead to lung cancer (and other cancers). This proved a
57 G Tweedale and D J Jeremy, 'Compensating the 58 66/1011. Bateman to TBA, 27 June 1938.
workers: industrial injury and compensation in the
British asbestos industry, 1930s-1960s', Business
History, forthcoming.
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particular pitfall for claimants, then as now. Turner & Newall workers began dying from
asbestosis andlung cancer at least as early as 1932. During the next twenty years, at least
18 TBAemployees were found atpost-mortem tohavehad lungcancer (usually combined
with asbestosis). From its earliest occurrence in Turner & Newall workers, it proved
difficult for the medical experts to decide upon its significance. In none ofthe early cases
of lung cancer/asbestosis did the company admit liability, mainly because the Medical
Board did not issue any asbestosis death certificates. For example, in 1938, doctors at the
inquest of TBA weaver John Greaves were divided. Although Greaves had been classed
as totally disabled by asbestosis and this was confirmed at the post-mortem, the
investigation also revealed heart failure and cancer of the lung. When questioned by the
coroner, the Manchester pathologist, Dr Charles E Jenkins, replied that "the cancer may
have been caused by asbestosis in this case or it may not. He was not prepared to say." 59
Although the jury found that Greaves died from heart failure and cancer accelerated by
asbestosis, the Medical Board refused to issue a certificate confirming that death was due
to asbestosis, and Turner & Newall denied all liability and payment. The company did the
same in 1940, when a Turner's Asbestos Cement worker died from lung cancer and
asbestosis. Despite the coroner's returning a verdict in line with the medical evidence, the
Medical Board again declined to issue acertificate confirming adeath due to asbestosis.60
However, the number oflung cancers amongst suspended TBA workers was growing. At
the inquest ofRochdale asbestos bag-carrier, Mark Rush Snr, the post-mortem findings were
lung cancer/asbestosis. However, Turner & Newall still claimed in public that death was not
due to asbestosis, bolstered by the fact that the Medical Board agreed with them by refusing
toissue adeathcertificate. Rush'swidowreceived nolump sum. Bytheearly 1950s, although
some inquests were returning verdicts ofdeath due to lung cancer accelerated by asbestosis,
usually medical opinion gave the company the benefit ofthe doubt. Even in the 1960s, well
after Doll's pathbreaking article had confirmed the link, Turner & Newall and the Medical
Panel were stillunhappy withinquests wherelungcancerandasbestosis wereblamedifthere
was no naked eye evidence ofthe latter.61 The inquest on TBA worker Florence M Russell
was such an occasion. "Very little fibrosis apparent from naked eye examination", stated the
company; however, the lung histology confimned asbestosis and the coroner returned a
verdict ofdeath by industrial disease. Turner & Newall expressed surprise and believed that
the Medical Panel would notacceptthe verdict, either. Butas thecoronerput it: "I doubt that
the Pneumoconiosis Medical Panel will accept this as the cause ofdeath, but it is according
tomyverdict."62 Provingthelungcancer/asbestos linkwasstill evidentlyproblematical inthe
eyes ofthe government. In the 1970s, asbestos was still notalways classed as afactorin lung
cancer deaths of Turner & Newall staff (even if they had been suspended). One asbestotic
TBA worker, Arthur Mellowdew, died oflung cancer in 1976. However, despite the fact that
the pleura over both lungs were thickened (almost certainly due to asbestosis), the Medical
Panel decided that asbestosis was not a factor in the man's death.63
59 65/1797. Bussy to Ellison, 29 Sept. 1938. 62 122/1353. J Arnold to J Kemp, 11 June 1965.
60 38/1231. James Pickstone file. 63 Bilateral pleural thickening was not prescribed
61 It should be noted thatTurner & Newall had as an asbestos-related disease until 1985-the same
tried to dissuade Doll from publishing his paper and year as lung cancer. See Wikeley, op. cit., note 13
had also attempted to block its publication in the above, pp. 177-9.
British Journal ofIndustrial Medicine.
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Mesothelioma deaths also occurred amongst Turner & Newall workers between 1936
and 1960: seven cases at Turner & Newall can be identified with reasonable certainty.64
Since mesothelioma did not become a prescribed asbestos disease until 1966, there was
little chance that the dependants of such workers would have much success with claims.
For example, in 1939 the inquest on Edmund Pilling, a 49-year-old TBA cheese-winder
and disintegrator, reported that one of the deceased's lungs was covered with a pleural
cancerous growth and that there some asbestosis. But the pathologist gave greater weight
to the former, leading the courttodecidethat asbestosis had neithercaused noraccelerated
the cancer as a cause ofdeath.65 The Medical Board, in turn, declined to certify death as
due to asbestosis and the widow was unable to make a claim.66 No doubt, the company
and the Medical Board-had they known offuture events-would have argued that it was
impossible before 1960 to have known ofthe mesothelioma risk and so their actions were
reasonable. However, this is not a view that has been endorsed in asbestos litigation in the
1990s.67
Turner & Newall's resistance to any negative medical verdict was not pointless. They
knew that whatever the coroner's verdict, the dependants still needed a Medical Board
death certificate confirming asbestosis as the cause ofdeath. After the costs ofthe illness
and funeral, this was another expense for claimants, who had to pay £2.2.0d, of which
£1.IO.Od was refunded ifthe certificate was issued. ForTurner & Newall the cost ofeach
certificate was £10, a sum ofwhich the company was notunmindful. Without acertificate,
Turner & Newall almost invariably denied liability. As the company secretary, J L Collins,
arrogantly remarked during one case in 1946: "the verdict at the Inquest ... is of course
immaterial ... as ... we do not accept statements that deaths are due to asbestosis unless
we receive a certificate to that effect from the Medical Board itself."68 Ofcourse, Turner
& Newall's opinions themselves were "immaterial" ifthe autopsy report and the Medical
Board certificate confirmed an asbestosis death. At this stage, the Board's role was more
positive in its defence of the worker. Turner & Newall had little influence over its
decisions and had no access to its files (much to their annoyance). For better or worse, it
gave a final decision as to the cause of death. Even so, Medical Board death certificates
proved ararity. Remarkably, as Table 3 shows, between 1932 and 1940 only 15 asbestosis
death certificates were issued for the whole of the industry (at TBA, the figure was 8).69
This was partly because certificates were issued only on application and payment ofafee;
it also reflected the fact that some certificates were refused. Usually, the Medical Board
rubber-stamped the verdict ofthe inquests (which its representatives rarely attended); but
it could also occasionally reverse decisions. Again, this highlights the rule of thumb
element in medical diagnosis and no doubt it gave an unpleasant surprise to dependants.
64 Castleman, op. cit., note 7 above, pp. 123-4. 1995, T&N lawyers argued that J W Roberts could
65 123/3812. Pilling file. See 'Cancer ofthe lung: not have foreseen mesothelioma as a health risk
inquest on an asbestos worker. Death not due to between the 1930s and 1950s. Mr Justice Holland,
work', Rochdale Observer, 24 May 1939. however, ruled that since T&N could have foreseen
66 This was unfortunate in view of the fact that the some form ofpersonal injury to the plaintiffs, its
widow (who had partly to support two daughters) exact form was irrelevant.
was in poor health and straitened circumstances. 68 61/1171. Collins to Cole, Washington Chemical
T&N must have felt some responsibility, as they paid Co., 29 Nov. 1946. Thirlaway file.
her a small ex-gratia of about lOs a week until 1944. 69 A small but unknown number ofcertificates
67 In Margerson-Hancock v. J W Roberts case, were also issued for asbestosis and tuberculosis.
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Table 3:
Medical Board (and TBA) Asbestosis Death Statistics, 1932-40
YEAR DEATHS
Applications Certified
1932 2 - 2
1933 5 1 1 1
1934 2 1 2 1
1935 2 1 1 1
1936 1 - 1
1937
1938 1 - - -
1939 3 2 4 2
1940 6 3 4 3
TOTAL 22 8 15 8
Medical Board figures in bold; Turner Brothers Asbestos in italics.
Source: 113/1668. F Bussy memorandum, 16 Feb. 1942.
In 1946 the inquest on the J W Roberts' weaverFlorence Fairbourn had returned a verdict
of death by "haemor-pericarditis, following asbestosis of the lungs and pleura"-yet the
Medical Panel refused to issue a certificate confirming that death was due to asbestosis.
How it reached this decision is unknown,70 yet it had important repercussions for the
family, as Fairbourn supported her husband (a clerk, who was said to have been a semi-
invalid), a young daughter and widowed mother. There is no record of any lump sum
payment to the family.7' In 1947 the Medical Panel reversed another inquest's
asbestosis/lung cancer verdict, by stating that the deceased did not have asbestosis.72
Similarly, in the case of TBA asbestos weaver Charles Crewe's death in 1953, the
inquest's finding of sudden heart failure seems have influenced the Medical Panel more
than the fact that he also had significant disease ofthe lungs with evidence of asbestosis.
They refused to confirm that death was due to industrial disease.
70 Later the Ministry ofPensions & National
Insurance did occasionally publish Medical Panel
decisions in controversial cases. See Decision No
R(T) 9156 re. death ofa boiler lagger in 1955 with
asbestosis, which the Panel declined to certify as a
death from pneumoconiosis.
71 As noted above, Florence Fairbourn had been
frequently examined by the Medical Board, but never
suspended. Did the Board feel that they were unable
to change their verdict and admit their mistake? The
claims' file for Fairbourn mentions a "minor accident"
before herdeath, but this was not raised at the inquest.
72 G H Ashman file. Ashman's employment record
was interesting, as he had worked at Turner &
Newall for only 16 months. However, his previous
employment had been with a brake-lining
manufacturers in Bury for 13 years. Did this previous
occupation, which was presumably not "scheduled",
influence the Medical Board in believing that this
worker (who was never suspended) could never have
developed significant asbestosis in 16 months? It
should be noted that the standard Form A death
certificate issued by the Medical Panel included a
footnote, which stated that ifthey were satisfied that
asbestosis could not have been contracted in the
industry due to the shortness ofemployment, then
they "should certify accordingly".
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Medical Panel disagreements with pathologists and inquest verdicts continued into the
1970s. An inquest on Enoch Stockton in 1971 decided that death was due to bronchitis
with asbestosis as a contributory factor. The Medical Panel decided the latter was not a
factor. In the case ofRoberts' sprayerDonald Sharp, the inquestpathologist found that the
main cause of death in 1974 was coronary artery disease, though she believed that the
man's asbestosis (he had been suspended in 1970 after only about eight years' work) had
made him less able to survive a heart attack. The Medical Panel, however, ruled that this
was not a factor in the death.73
Yet although the Medical Board occasionally reversed inquest verdicts, it does not
appear to have been inclined to revise its own opinions. In the case of David Kerrighan,
for example, the inquest in 1946 recorded death by asbestosis and tuberculosis. The
Medical Board had declined to suspend him ten years earlier (after he had left work
through ill-health) and do not appear to have issued a certificate after his death. Turner &
Newall, therefore, made no lump sum payment to the family, which was in severe
financial difficulties. Besidesdebts fromKerrighan's illness, thewidow was inpoorhealth
herself and she and her four children were living on about £4 a week.74
Conclusion
The Medical Board's involvement with the asbestos industry was part of a pioneering
government effort to protect and compensate workers in one of the dangerous trades. In
terms of what had preceded it, the work of the Medical Board could not help but
ameliorate working conditions in the industry. Yet in other ways, the efforts of the
government to protect asbestos workers tell a more depressing tale.
Overall, the Medical Board failed to protect workers as well as it might. Admittedly it
was in an invidious position: the medical arrangements scheme was based upon the
assumption that by monitoring asbestosis the disease and mortality could be controlled.
This proved false and the rationale collapsed entirely with the emergence of
mesothelioma, which does not show a clear dose-response relationship. By the time the
Medical Board could diagnose and suspend workers the damage had already been done,
and perhaps a more active policy would not have had a major impact on mortality, as the
underlying problem was dust. Medical examiners were being asked to rectify a situation
that should have been prevented at source by better dust control and Factory Inspectorate
action. Some Medical Panel physicians, when they did express opinions on theirjob, were
suitably despairing. One of them wrote in 1965: "What evidence is there that periodic
examinations have prevented the development of asbestosis and its sequelae? As regards
initial examinations the Pneumoconiosis Medical Panels have to decide whether new
entrants are suitable for the industry. The question that should be asked is, whether the
employment is suitable for the worker."75
But the efficacy of the Panels was not helped by a suspension policy that was far too
conservative and limited evertoprovide whatits supportershoped-an earlywarning sign
73 33/387: file ofEnoch Stockton (1905-71); small grant (£25) and voted the widow lOs a week
116/873-6: Donald Sharp (1931-74) inquest ex-gratia.
depositions. 7 J C McVittie, 'Asbestosis in Great Britain', Ann.
4 122/937-991. The company eventually paid a N. Y Acad. Sci.,1965, 132 (i): 128-38, 137-8.
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of asbestosis. The Turner & Newall records therefore support some of the views of
Medical Board critics, who have highlighted (from experiences since the 1960s) the
conservatism of diagnoses and evidence of corporate influence. The only factor that
appears to have changed by the 1970s was that claimants were a little less inclined to
accept Medical Panel decisions without protest.76 Quite why the Medical Board were so
ineffective remains tobeexplored in more detail. Itmay bethattheproblems wereentirely
diagnostic, stemming from a newly-prescribed disease. However, this article has
highlighted other factors, which were political and not medical. Amongst them was the
evident reluctance of the Medical Board to make workers redundant and unemployable,
especially during the depression and wartime. The opposition of the asbestos industry,
which was a growing economic force in this period, to the Asbestosis Scheme also cannot
be discounted.77 Whatever the reasons, the evidence presented here does not endorse the
view that the introduction ofMedical Boards in the asbestos industry "was an innovation
... that seems to have been amply justified by the results".78 Nor does it show that the
scheme "worked well and without substantial complaint".79
Perhaps the greatest tragedy ofMedical Board policies was that they contributed to the
minimization of the asbestos health-problem. By failing to suspend workers and issue
death certificates, the Medical Board played a part in the underestimation of the risks
involved in asbestos manufacture. The asbestos industry soon found that the number of
suspensions was light (relative to the size of the workforce) and that the medical costs
were negligible. Until 1948, Turner & Newall paid out£15,690 for medical examinations
and £57,476 in compensation, while over the same period they amassed profits after tax
of over £14 million. The Medical Board gave the industry every opportunity to keep
reported cases of asbestosis to a minimum. Only slowly did the true picture unfold.
Despite the Medical Boards (and the dust control regulations of 1931), mortality from
asbestosis continued atTurner & Newall (and other asbestos firms). In the 1960s, cases of
asbestosis showed a marked rise in the UK from about 20 or 30 cases a year in the 1950s,
to over 100 a year by the late 1960s (and this was aside from the asbestos cancer
mortality). This was a harbinger of the rising trend of mesothelioma deaths, which is a
feature of the current asbestos health problem. If the asbestos industry bears the primary
responsibility for this situation, government medical officers must also share some ofthe
blame.
76 For example, Ferodo worker Nathaniel Whyte Newall and other asbestos firms also financed
was refused a certificate for asbestosis by the Panel medical research through the industry-controlled
in 1975. Local hospital and independent physicians Asbestosis Research Council, founded in 1957.
were used in a successful claim against the company. 78 Arnold Wilson and Hermann Levy, Workmen's
See 33/358. compensation, 2 vols, Oxford University Press,
77 A cynic might point out that Turner & Newall 1939-1941, vol. 1, p. 266.
not only provided jobs for asbestos workers, but 79 Meiklejohn, op. cit., note 17 above, p. 207. This
were also benefactors to the medical community. In author was a member ofthe Medical Board in the
1939, Sir Samuel Turner built and equipped the 1930s.
Dental School at Manchester University. Turner &
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